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INTRODUCTION
Litigation before national and international courts can aim at
two different kinds of results: direct effects, which concern the
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concrete resolution of the legal dispute at stake; and also indirect
effects, with the goal of wider social and cultural impact. As argued
by Dia Anagnostou and Effie Fokas in the case of the European
Court of Human Rights:
Indirect effects include the ways in which international human
rights judgments may influence domestic debates in law, politics
and academia, raise public consciousness, change how social
actors perceive and articulate their grievances and claims,
empower national rights institutions, or prompt mobilization
among civil society and other rights advocates. 1

The same thing has been argued by Justices of the United States
Supreme Court. Judges not only resolve disputes, but “teach.”2 To
this extent, an approach to the study of law that takes into account
its relationships with social movements can highlight
characteristics of legal developments that are otherwise not
considered. Such an approach can be the key to understanding the
role of law in polarized societies in the context of the culture wars,3
considering that legal arguments and doctrines contribute to
cultural understandings of the law and the role of social

1. Dia Anagnostou & Effie Fokas, The “Radiating Effects” of the European Court of
Human Rights on Social Mobilisations Around Religion in Europe—An Analytical Frame 2
(Grassrootmobilise Working Paper No. 1, 2015), http://grassrootsmobilise.eu/theradiating-effects-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-on-social-mobilisations-aroundreligion-in-europe-an-analytical-frame/. While the authors focus their attention on the
European Court of Human Rights, they also mention that “studies show that decisions of
high profile and authoritative courts like the U.S. Supreme Court prompt individuals to
clearly elaborate their attitudes on an issue, crystallizing their views for or against the ruling
and underpinning a broad range of mobilization efforts.” Id.
2. According to Laurence Tribe:
Justice Kennedy’s opinions have repeatedly emphasized the notion that, through
the decisions it announces and the reasons it offers for those decisions, the Court
does more than resolve the particular ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ entrusted to it for
resolution. He has observed: ‘By our opinions, we teach’ . . . [t]he idea that the
populace at large will actually read the Court’s opinions may seem naive. But if
one reflects on how those opinions reverberate through both traditional and social
media outlets, the idea’s innocence may come to be appreciated and even admired
in time.
Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 23–24 (2015).
3. Christopher McCrudden, Transnational Culture Wars, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 434
(2015). The development of the concept of dignity in adjudication is also part of a
transnational exchange. See Steve Sanders, Dignity and Social Meaning: Obergefell, Windsor,
and Lawrence as Constitutional Dialogue, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069 (2019); Reva B. Siegel,
Dignity and Sexuality: Claims on Dignity in Transnational Debates over Abortion and Same-Sex
Marriage, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 355 (2012).

1156

1157

Christian Conservative Arguments on Human Dignity

movements in developing the law.4 Discussion on rights, and in our
case on dignity, can therefore be understood as discursive logic that
“shape[s] the normative [and political] frames through which
individual
and
collective
actors
conceptualise . . . social
problems.”5 The aim of this contribution is to assess the role of
arguments based on human dignity by conservative Christian
groups in their litigation strategies in leading cases before the
U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights.
After the introduction, Part II offers some methodological remarks
on the study, and Part III discusses the problems concerning the
definition of dignity and Christian contributions to its definition.
Part IV discusses the “radiating effects” of litigation; Part V
analyzes the role played by arguments based on human dignity in
leading cases before the two courts; and Part VI concludes that,
in the cases analyzed, arguments based on dignity have only
played a marginal role.
I. METHODOLOGY
This article builds on the work done in the context of three
European Research Council projects in which I have been involved:
ReligioWest, Grassrootmobilise, and Postsecular Conflicts.6 I have
applied some limitations to the selection of cases to be analyzed:
after mapping relevant cases for the purpose of this study, I limited
the selection to the last ten years (2010–20). I further limited my
analysis to five cases per court, for a total of ten cases: five in the
U.S. Supreme Court and five in the European Court of Human
Rights. The list of selected cases is provided at the end of this Part
in a table. This selection of cases permits comparison between the
two courts. I also decided to select these cases in order to cover
different topics with direct relevance for the interests of religious
4. Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 877 (2013).
5. Anagnostou & Fokas, supra note 1, at 6.
6. Information on these research projects can be found on their respective websites.
ReligioWest: The Project, EUR. UNIV. INST., https://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/
RobertSchumanCentre/Research/ArchivesInstitutionsGovernanceDemocracy/Religiowest
/Religiowest#:~:text=The%20project%20analyses%20how%20religions,pressure%20to%20a
dapt%20to%20secularism.&text=This%20’formatting’%20pushes%20many%20religions,cha
plains’%20in%20the%20army) (last visited Feb. 13, 2021); GRASSROOTSMOBILISE,
http://grassrootsmobilise.eu/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2021); Postsecular Conflicts, UNIVERSITÄT
INNSBRUCK,
https://www.uibk.ac.at/projects/postsecular-conflicts/
(last
visited
Feb. 13, 2021).
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groups, religious non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or
public-interest law firms with strong religious connections. The
topics selected are same-sex marriage, abortion, collective religious
freedom, individual religious freedom, and migration. I selected
these topics as they usually are within the typical domain of actions
and engagement for religious groups in litigation both in the
United States and Europe. These cases were also selected based
on their relevance in scholarly debates. Time does not allow
for covering all possible cases—that would require a book—but
these still illuminate relevant trends in litigation on religion and
human dignity.
One basic issue to deal with has been the definition of the
“Christian” or “conservative” legal movement for the purpose of
this contribution. I think we can use as a working definition the one
proposed by Daniel Bennett: “multi-issue organization dedicated
to the interests of Christian conservatives primarily through legal
strategies and tactics.”7 I do not equate the notion of “Christian”
with the notion of “conservative.” In litigation we have often seen
progressive religious groups submitting their arguments before
different courts. However, for the purpose of this study, I focus
only on conservative Christian groups as they have been identified
by different studies as being at the forefront of transnational
litigation on religion.8
U.S. Supreme Court
Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S.
644 (2015)

European Court of
Human Rights
Oliari v. Italy,
18766/11;
36030/11 (2015)

Topic
Same-Sex Marriage

7. Daniel Bennett, The Rise of Christian Conservative Legal Organizations, RELIGION &
POL. (June 10, 2015), https://religionandpolitics.org/2015/06/10/the-rise-of-christianconservative-legal-organizations. Bennett lists the following organizations as examples
in the United States: Alliance Defending Freedom, American Center for Law and
Justice, Center for Law and Religious Freedom, Liberty Counsel, Liberty Institute,
National Legal Foundation, Pacific Justice Institute, Thomas More Law Center, and
Thomas More Society. Id.; see also DANIEL BENNETT, DEFENDING FAITH: THE POLITICS OF
THE CHRISTIAN CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (2017); Daniel Bennett, A Match Made in
Heaven? Linking Christian Legal Advocacy with Conservative Politics, in THE EVANGELICAL
CRACKUP? THE FUTURE OF EVANGELICAL-REPUBLICAN COALITION 222–38 (Paul A. Djupe &
Ryan L. Claassen eds., 2018).
8. See CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, LITIGATING RELIGIONS: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, COURTS, AND BELIEFS (2018).

1158

1159

Christian Conservative Arguments on Human Dignity

Russo v. June
Medical Services
LLC, 140 S. Ct. 2103
(2020)
Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.,
573 U.S. 682 (2014)
Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil
Rights Commission,
138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018)
Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392
(2018)

A, B & C v. Ireland, Abortion
25579/05 (2010)
Fernández
Martínez v. Spain,
56030/07 (2014)
Lautsi v. Italy,
30814/06 (2011)

Collective
Religious Freedom

F.G. v. Sweden,
43611/11 (2016)

Migration

Individual
Religious Freedom

Table 1: List of Selected Cases
II. WHICH DIGNITY?
The dignity of the human person has been at the center of
the movement that promoted universal human rights after the
Second World War. There are, of course, several intellectual sources
that have contributed to the development and evolution of the
notion and relevance of human dignity.9 As explained by Samuel
Moyn, an important role in this context has been played by the
Catholic Church:
The Roman Catholic Church had previously rejected the hitherto
secular and liberal language of human rights. But now the pope
turned to it, making human dignity its new basis. Around the
same time, ecumenical formations of transatlantic Protestant
elites proclaimed human rights to be the key to future world
order. The communion between human rights and Christianity
was therefore a novel and fateful departure in the history of
political discourse.10

9. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Christian Dignity and Overlapping Consensus, 46 BYU
L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2021) (“The idea of dignity was present in antiquity, but the idea
of Christian dignity arose from theology and social rank in the Middle Ages.”
(footnotes omitted)).
10. Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights: An Introduction, 28 KING’S L.J. 1, 2 (2017).
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The Catholic Church, and Christian groups in general, have
often tried to advance their own understandings of human dignity.
Recently, some scholars have also suggested that religious groups,
and in particular the Catholic Church, should shift their focus from
the protection of human rights to the protection of dignity:
The Catholic Church would be far better able to explain itself, and
to explain the genuine core radicalism (after some needed
theoretical pruning) of its positions in these areas, if it consistently
abandoned rights in favour of dignity and criticized the abuses of
justice consequent upon the hegemony of rights with respect to
more political and economic issues also. 11

This phenomenon results from the proliferation of rights and
the critique of “new rights.” Whether this enterprise will succeed
will depend on how these arguments are developed and whether
courts follow this line of reasoning in their adjudication. Religious
groups, in particular, should always take into account the need to
develop inclusive notions of dignity in order to avoid forging and
supporting notions that tend to exclude.12
It is, however, important to underline that there does not seem
to be a shared conception of human dignity across different
jurisdictions and between the two courts13 at the core of this study.
Moreover, within the same jurisdiction conceptions of dignity seem
to differ and lack common ground. In the United States, the line of
jurisprudence primarily influenced by Justice Kennedy that
ultimately led to Obergefell v. Hodges seems to have been driven by
the central concern for the dignity of individuals. As Yuvraj Joshi
has pointed out, initially this line of jurisprudence, from Planned

11. John Milbank, Dignity Rather Than Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY
199, 205 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013).
12. See generally the critique developed in this issue by Gedicks, supra note 9.
13. This is underlined by Paolo G. Carozza:
[T]here is a practical consensus around a core meaning of human dignity, lesser
but discernible convergences of understanding around a cluster of key questions,
values, and circumstances that are related to dignity, and some sharp
disagreements and even contradictions that reflect not only the variety of
intellectual and moral traditions in which the concept has its roots but also
differences in the specific political, social, and cultural contexts in which the very
broad principle gets instantiated.
Paolo G. Carozza, Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Human Experience, in UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 11, at 615, 619. On the definition of human dignity, see also Mark
L. Movsesian, Of Human Dignities, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517 (2016).
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Parenthood v. Casey14 to Lawrence v. Texas,15 focused mainly on
individual freedom of choice.16 However, this understanding
started to change in United States v. Windsor17 and Obergefell v.
Hodges,18 as “[d]ignity veered away from respect for the freedom to
make personal and intimate choices without interference.”19
At least two notions of dignity are highlighted in this context. One
is defined as “dignity as respect”20 and “appeals to a person’s
freedom to make personal and intimate choices without
interference.”21 The other understanding of dignity is defined
as “dignity as respectability” and “appeals to the social
acceptability and worthiness of the personal choices being
made and those making them.”22 It is based on this distinction
that Joshi offers a critique of the Obergefell decision, not from
a conservative standpoint, as we often have seen, but rather from
a progressive position:
It is perhaps ironic that gaining “equal dignity in the eyes of the
law” requires same-sex couples to establish the same love and
commitment that the law takes for granted in the case of
heterosexual couples. But, what is more troubling is overlooking
that same-sex and unmarried relationships might adopt different
forms of loving and commitment―and that these different
intimacies might too be entitled to equal respect and dignity.23

14. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
15. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
16. Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR.
117, 117 (2015).
17. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
19. Joshi, supra note 16.
20. Id. at 118.
21. Id. at 119. “It gives due regard to her feelings, wishes, and beliefs about personal
decisions, so that she can make decisions that fulfill her sense of true self and feel a sense of
personal and social worth from being her true self in public.” Id.
22. Id. According to Joshi:
It affirms decisions because and only insofar as they have and show the qualities
that are deemed dignified by a normative standard of behavior. This respectable
meaning of dignity is in deep conflict with the intuitive idea of dignity as respect.
By demarcating the boundaries of “dignified” choices, it undercuts the freedom to
make personal and intimate choices without interference.
Id.
23. Id. at 123. The same arguments critical of the reasoning at the basis of the
decision have been raised by Gregg Strauss, What’s Wrong with Obergefell, 40 CARDOZO
L. REV. 631 (2018).
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Are the different doctrinal conflicts on the definition of a shared
notion of dignity enough to declare the experiment with human
dignity failed or destined to fail? Litigation before courts can
further contribute to clarifying the potential of human dignity in
the living experience of different realities. This does not signify that
we need a global and Cartesian concept of human dignity that is
applicable everywhere with the same meaning. It also does not
signify that the Christian and religious understandings of dignity
are the only contributions that need to be taken into account in
further developing such a notion. The concept of human dignity
has to be understood as the basis of a global effort for the promotion
and protection of fundamental rights. As Paolo Carozza reminds
us: “The ontological claim of human dignity helps sustain the very
possibility of human rights as global principles that can and should
help us condition sovereignty and hold accountable those who
abuse power, especially the power of the state.”24
There seems therefore to be an important role for dignity in
global and comparative constitutional law, especially in a historical
period where “rights discourse” is under attack in many countries
in the world. Work on properly defining and applying human
dignity also helps us challenge the mainstream narrative of the
“rights project” as only and necessarily a progressive project. In his
work, Moyn has challenged this narrative: for him it is impossible
to understand the development and genesis of human rights
without a proper analysis of the development of conservative and
religious thinking. As Moyn has argued:
[T]he general thesis of my new book, Christian Human Rights, is
that through this lost and misremembered transwar era, it is
equally if not more viable to regard human rights as a project of
the Christian right, not the secular left. Their creation brought
about a break with the revolutionary tradition and its droits de
l’homme, or—better put—a successful capture of that language by
forces reformulating their conservatism. 25

The litigation before courts, and the work on the notion of human
dignity by several actors, could therefore contribute to a new
paradigm of rights protection centered on individual and collective
human dignity. Developing an approach based on dignity could
also help bring in the conservative legal movement, which does not
24. Carozza, supra note 13, at 620.
25. Moyn, supra note 10, at 5.
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necessarily have an initial focus on individual human rights and is
influenced by religious traditions.
III. LITIGATION AND ITS “RADIATING EFFECTS”
Litigation on religious issues has become an important
phenomenon of our time. As argued by McCrudden, “[o]ne of the
most obvious features of the landscape of religious litigation has
been the increasing number of courts that are now open to receiving
and adjudicating disputes between human rights and religious
beliefs.”26 In this context, an important role is played by religious
NGOs and religiously oriented public-interest law firms.
According to McCrudden, “[t]here is growing evidence that the
legislative and political role of NGOs, both secular and religious, is
now being supplemented by an additional role: the initiation and
conduct of, or participation in, litigation at the domestic level and
beyond.”27 Among these organizations, NGOs, and public-interest
law firms litigating before the U.S. Supreme Court and the
European Court of Human Rights, conservative Christian
organizations have played an important role. In the United States,
several studies have highlighted the distinct character of the culture
of conservative Christian litigation. As Hans J. Hacker has put it,
“during the 1990s conservative Christian attorneys began to
present courts with the argument that government sometimes
penalizes legitimate religious expression in attempting to avoid
entanglement, and that religious speech should be given the same
protection from governmental intrusion as any other form of
protected speech.”28
As a reaction to the cultural conflicts of the sixties and the
increasing relevance of progressive ideas in society, religious
conservatives began to organize in order to guarantee the
influence of Christian morals and values in the public square
and public policies:
They have attempted to fulfill the goal of “reclaiming America”
by placing primary importance on working within those bastions
of majoritarianism in American politics—the U.S. Congress, state
legislatures, and the electoral process. In particular, legislative
lobbying has held the position of primary importance within the
26. MCCRUDDEN, supra note 8, at 42.
27. Id. at 46.
28. HANS J. HACKER, THE CULTURE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LITIGATION xi (2005).
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New Christian Right’s overall strategy—the organizations that
represent conservative Christian interests in Congress have
always been the best funded, best organized, most highly visible,
and most aggressive of all the many and varied institutions that
compose the far-flung movement.29

In addition to legislative lobbying, litigation before courts have
been a major part of this effort, where litigation was understood as
a useful tool to “change the world.”30 As argued by Jay A. Sekulow,
General Counsel for the American Center for Law and Justice, these
organizations were not meaning
to carry the day on the culture with politics alone. Our job is to
keep [the] avenues open, make sure the church can be the
church. . . . We are there to make sure the church’s voice is heard.
Somebody said once we’re Jesus lawyers. Jesus doesn’t need a
lawyer. But the church does. I believe the church needs
organizations that will defend the integrity of Christians in the
public square.31

After the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of
Lawrence v. Texas,32 where a decision of the European Court of
Human Rights was quoted in the majority opinion, some
conservative Christian organizations began to wonder if the
Strasbourg Court could be perceived as a threat because of the
possibility that its precedent could have a persuasive influence on
the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore, Christian
conservative religious groups started to litigate in Strasbourg as
well. Transnational litigation on religious issues is therefore, as we
have mentioned, characterized by a strong influence from
American organizations and public-interest law firms.33 As
McCrudden argues:
29. Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
30. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, TO CHANGE THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY, AND
POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN WORLD (2010).
31. HACKER, supra note 28, at 5 (quoting Jay A. Sekulow, General Counsel, Am. Ctr.
for L. & Just. (1998)).
32. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
33. American organizations are now also particularly active in Europe. See Effie Fokas,
Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in the Shadow of European Court of
Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence, 4 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 54 (2015); see also
Effie Fokas, Comparative Susceptibility and Differential Effects on the Two European Courts: A
Study of Grasstops Mobilizations Around Religion, 5 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 541 (2016)
[hereinafter Comparative Susceptibility]. According to Fokas, “[t]he predominance of the
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It is a noticeable feature of religious transnational litigation that it
is, in the main, US conservative NGOs which are at the forefront of
this development, a phenomenon that warrants a brief
explanation. After Lawrence, the ECtHR has been a particular
target for interventions. The largest group of NGOs active before
the Court is based in the United Kingdom, but the second largest
group of NGOs comes from the United States, including several
that are law school clinics, and a significant proportion of that
group of US NGOs is made up of religious conservative groups. 34

The key role of American organizations has been highlighted
also by Laura Van den Eynde, who has noticed an increase in thirdparty interventions from the United States before the European
Court of Human Rights over the years.35 As Eugenia Relaño Pastor
has also argued, the “United States and Canada provide the best
developed examples of NGO involvement in religious litigation
and in litigation specifically by religious groups.”36
An analysis of their interventions before the Courts can help us
in highlighting if, and to what extent, legal arguments based on
dignity play a role in their strategic litigation before the judiciary.
IV. AMICUS BRIEFS AND CHRISTIAN ARGUMENTS BEFORE COURTS
Christopher McCrudden has already underlined the extent to
which judicial interpretations of human rights are influenced or
shape the concept of human dignity.37 McCrudden has also stressed
how the concept of dignity is often context-specific and depends on
both the jurisdiction and the timeframe.38 For McCrudden the
concept of dignity might also generate some problems, given its
vague and changing notion which might open the way to an
increase in judicial discretion.39 But have the U.S. Supreme Court
United States in this field of study is not surprising: American society is historically actively
litigious . . . the US provides one of the best developed examples of NGO and civil society
engagement in religious litigation and of litigation specifically by religious groups.”
Comparative Susceptibility, supra, at 547 (citations omitted).
34. MCCRUDDEN, supra note 8, at 53.
35. Laura Van den Eynde, An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human
Rights NGOs Before the European Court of Human Rights, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271 (2013).
36. Eugenia Relaño Pastor, Christian Faith-Based Organizations as Third-Party
Interveners at the European Court of Human Rights, 46 BYU L. REV. 1329, 1340–41 (2021).
37. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human
Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (2008).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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and the European Court of Human Rights taken dignity into
account so far? Jean Paul Costa, former President of the European
Court of Human Rights, has investigated the role and use of human
dignity in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights. First, he noticed the absence of the concept of dignity in the
text of the Convention,40 but over the years both the European
Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights began to elaborate an approach to human dignity.41 As Costa
underlined, many of the cases in which human dignity has played
a role have been decided under Article 3 of the Convention.42
Dignity has also played a rule in adjudication before the U.S.
Supreme Court, as multiple scholars have highlighted.43 It is
therefore worth asking whether human dignity has played any
role, if not directly in the decision-making of the Courts, then at
least in submissions by conservative Christian groups in their
amicus briefs. This analysis can help to illuminate the supply side
40. According to Costa,
[t]he absence of dignity is surprising, the more so if one considers that the text of
the European Convention is in many respects very close to that of the Universal
Declaration. . . . It is likely that the drafters nevertheless had the concept of dignity
in their minds, especially because the very establishment of the Council of Europe
in 1949 and the elaboration of the Convention, the first treaty prepared within its
framework, were the work of persons firmly opposed to the atrocities and
barbarity of the Second World War.
Jean-Paul Costa, Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 11, at 393, 394.
41. According to Costa, in a report dated December 1973, the Commission addressed
the issue of human dignity by stating that racial discrimination constitutes a breach of human
dignity. Costa highlights how “[t]his very first example of the use of the term dignity shows
that the Commission, and the Court subsequently, have never restricted their recourse to
dignity solely to Article 3, even if it is the field where it is most frequently applied.” Id. at
395. For the 1973 report of the Commission mentioned by Costa, see East African Asians v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 4403/70, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 76 (1973).

42. According to Costa,
[m]any of these cases deal with disproportionate use of physical force against
people in vulnerable situations, such as people arrested by police or detained in a
cell. The general principle is that when a person is deprived of liberty, any recourse
to physical force which is not strictly necessary diminishes human dignity, and is
in principle an infringement of Article 3.
Costa, supra note 40, at 396.
43. Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence,
84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006); AHARON BARAK, Human Dignity in American Constitutional Law, in
HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 185,
185–208 (2015).
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of the creation of legal arguments that has also contributed to the
wider legal culture and development of ideas that shape
constitutional adjudication.
A.

Same-Sex Marriage

1. Obergefell v. Hodges
Holding: The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license
a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize
their marriage when it was lawfully licensed and performed out of
state. Relevant references to dignity in the amicus briefs submitted
to the Court are available in the table below.44
Organizations
Ryan T. Anderson
(Heritage Foundation)45
Family Research
Council46

Number of References to Dignity
One reference. Not central to
the argument.
One reference. Not central to
the argument.

44. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675–76 (2015).
45. Brief for Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
46. Brief for Fam. Rsch. Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
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Major Religious
Organizations47

Religious Organizations,
Public Speakers and
Scholars Concerned
About Free Speech50
Mike Huckabee Policy
Solutions and Family
Research Institute52
Foundation for
Moral Law53
International Conference

46:5 (2021)

Five references. Dignity central to
the protection of religious belief.
“This suppression of beliefs would
diminish the freedom of millions of
Americans to live their faith openly
and with dignity”;48 “These beliefs
about marriage are not going away.
Cherished by billions of believers
worldwide and tens of millions in
the U.S., these doctrines will not
change based on federal court
decisions, much less the shifting
tides of public opinion. They are
tied to theology, religious and
family practices, and entire ways of
life. They are no less essential to the
dignity and identity of millions of
Americans than petitioners’ sexual
orientation is to them.”49
Five references. “Freedom to speak
according to religious conscience is
essential to the dignity of each
person and to the stability of a selfgoverning Republic.”51
One reference. Not central to
the argument.
One obiter from Lawrence v. Texas.
One reference. Not central to

47. Brief for Major Religious Orgs. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
48. Id. at 29.
49. Id. at 34.
50. Brief for Religious Orgs. et al. Concerned About Free Speech as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562,
14-571, 14-574).
51. Id. at 31.
52. Brief for Mike Huckabee Pol’y Sols. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
53. Brief for Found. for Moral L. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
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of Evangelical Endorsers54 the argument.
United States Conference Four references. “It is not a
of Catholic Bishops55
judgment about the dignity or
worth of any person, married or
not” (p. 11); “[T]he Church’s
pastoral care of persons who are
sexually attracted solely or
predominantly to persons of the
same sex is informed not only by its
teaching about the proper use of the
sexual faculty, but by its conviction
that each and every human person,
regardless of sexual inclination, has
a dignity and worth that derives
from his or her Creator”;56 “[E]very
January, the Nation celebrates the
birthday of a minister, who drew
upon decidedly religious and moral
notions of human dignity in urging
the reform of American law.”57
Protectmarriage.com-Yes One reference. Not central to
on 8 et. al.58
the argument.
International Conference
One reference. “Absent appropriate
59
of Evangelical Endorsers
judicial restraint, nothing prevents
polygamy, bestiality, or any other
practice or crime which many
people currently would call a
perversion, from becoming a
constitutional right merely because
it provides some disaffected group
meaning, and alleged dignity, and

54. Brief for Int’l Conf. of Evangelical Endorsers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
55. Brief of U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
56. Id. at 11
57. Id. at 18.
58. Brief of Protectmarriage.com—Yes on 8 et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
59. Brief of the Int’l Conf. of Evangelical Endorsers, supra note 54.
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Catholic

Answers61

54 International and
Comparative Law
Experts from 27
Countries and the
Marriage and Family
Law Research Project63
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personal fulfillment.”60
Three references. “The People’s
desire to preserve the traditional
definition of marriage is neither
inspired by animus nor bigotry. It is
a choice made by informed and
engaged individuals who seek to
strike a balance between preserving
the rights of religious believers
while also promoting the dignity of
sexual minorities.”62
Three references. “Leading experts
have noted the importance of
protecting religious freedom and
finding nuanced compromises
that will afford maximal respect
to the dignity and freedom of
all concerned.”64

Table 2: Relevant References to Dignity
in the Amicus Briefs Submitted
Dignity in the judgment: Dignity is at the core of the majority
opinion written by Justice Kennedy. It is therefore possible to find
several references to the term. The conclusion of the opinion
summarizes the understanding of dignity in this case adopted by
Justice Kennedy. According to him, same-sex couples “ask for
equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them
that right.”65 This conception of dignity is criticized in the minority
opinions, especially in Justice Thomas’s dissent. He argues that
“[t]he government cannot bestow dignity, and it cannot take it
away.”66 As I have previously underlined, the use of dignity in this
judgment has been widely commented upon.
60. Id. at 26.
61. Brief of Cath. Answers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
62. Id. at i.
63. Brief for 54 Int’l L. Experts from 27 Countries et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
64. Id. at 31.
65. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 681.
66. Id. at 735 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Other religiously inspired organizations submitted amicus
briefs relevant for the purpose of this study but with no direct
reference to dignity.67
2. Oliari v. Italy
Holding: Italy failed to comply with the positive obligation to
respect the applicants’ private and family life as the State did not
provide a legal framework for the recognition and protection of
their relationship under domestic law.68
Dignity in the judgment: The only relevant reference to dignity
in the text of the judgment is made at paragraph 107 where the
position of the applicants is summarized: “The applicants
considered that the recognition in law of one’s family life and status
was crucial for the existence and well-being of an individual and
for his or her dignity.”69
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the
purpose of this study but with no direct reference to dignity.70

67. See, e.g., Brief for Gen. Conf. of the Seventh Day Adventists et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14571, 14-574); Brief for CatholicVote.org Educ. Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574);
Brief for Nat’l Coal. of Black Pastors & Christian Leaders as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574);
Brief for Inst. for Marriage & Pub. Pol’y et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (No. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); Brief for Texas
Values as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (Nos.
14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
68. Oliari v. Italy, App. Nos. 18766/11, 36030/11 (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-156265.
69. Id. at 107.
70. See, e.g., Brief for Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Amici Curiae, Oliari v. Italy, App. Nos.
18766/11, 36060/11 (2015); Brief for Pavel Parfentev on Behalf of Seven Russian NGOs (Fam.
& Demography Found. et al.) and Three Ukrainian NGOs (Parental Comm. of Ukraine et al.)
as Amici Curiae, Oliari v. Italy, App. Nos. 18766/11, 36060/11 (2015). These organizations
were given leave to intervene by the Vice President of the Chamber, but no submissions were
received by the court.
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Migration71

1. Trump v. Hawaii
Holding: The President has lawfully exercised the discretion
granted to him under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) to suspend the entry of
aliens into the United States.72 Respondents did not demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that Presidential
Proclamation No. 9645 violates the Establishment Clause.
Dignity in the judgment: There is no reference to arguments
based on dignity in the judgment.
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the
purpose of this study but with no direct reference to dignity.73
2. F.G. v. Sweden
Holding: The applicant’s return to Iran would not constitute a
violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, on account of the
applicant’s political past in Iran.74 However, for the court there
would be a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention if
the applicant were to be returned to Iran without an ex nunc
assessment by the Swedish authorities of the consequences of his
religious conversion.
Dignity in the judgment: There is no reference to arguments
based on dignity in the judgment.
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the
purpose of this study but with no direct reference to dignity.75

71. For an overview of the relationships between human dignity and migration, see
Christine M. Venter, Human Dignity Has No Borders: Respecting the Rights of “People on the
Move” and the Rights and Religious Freedom of Those Who Aid Them, 46 BYU L. REV. 1369 (2021).
72. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
73. See, e.g., Brief for Christian Legal Soc’y et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither
Party, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); Brief for Found. for Moral L. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965);
Brief for Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Trump, 138 S. Ct.
2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); Brief for All. Defending Freedom as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); Brief for Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).
74. F.G.
v.
Sweden,
App.
No.
43611/11
(Mar.
23,
2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-161829.
75. See, e.g., Brief for Eur. Center for L. & Just. as Amicus Curiae, F.G. v. Sweden, App.
No. 43611/11 (2016); Brief for All. Defending Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae, F.G. v. Sweden,
App. No. 43611/11 (2016).
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C.

Individual Religious Freedom

1. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
Holding: The Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s actions in
assessing a cakeshop owner’s reasons for declining to make a cake
for a same-sex couple’s wedding celebration violated the free
exercise clause.76 Relevant references to dignity in the amicus briefs
submitted to the Court are available in the table below.
Organizations
Billy Graham Evangelistic
Association and others77
United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops and others78
Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty79

Reference to Dignity
One reference quoting from
Hobby Lobby. Not central to
the argument.
Six references. Two obiter
and the other references are
not direct.
Six references. Dignity is
understood as a foundational
principle: “The reality is that
with respect to participation
in wedding ceremonies,
dignity is and ought to be a
two-way street.”80

76. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
77. Brief for Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(No. 16-111).
78. Brief for U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
79. Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(No. 16-111).
80. Id. at 3.
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Christian business
owners supporting
religious freedom81
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Twenty-one references. Dignity
is understood as a key and
foundational principle: “For
devout religious citizens, such a
rule fatally erodes religious
freedom, freedom of speech,
protections of property rights,
and the substantive due process
of dignity, autonomy, and
identity”82; “The Court,
however, did not limit the
meaning of personal identity to
only marital and sexual choices,
but explained that the right
extends to all personal choices,
central to one’s dignity and
autonomy”83; “Although it
vigorously protected
Respondents’ ‘dignity’ rights,
the lower court unfairly
neglected the same rights by
Petitioners”84; “It appears
unwise, at best, to read
Obergefell’s dignity right as
bestowing on one group the
power to coerce compliance by
another, especially in violation
of the latter’s free speech and
religious convictions”85;
“Whatever the basis of this
dignity or identity right might
be, one of its boundaries must
be that it can compel tolerance
at most, but it cannot coerce
another’s endorsement or
participation, for that would
constitute a complementary
infringement of the latter’s
dignity or identity right”86; “For
followers of Jesus Christ,
adhering to His commands is
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Christian Legal Society88

the most personal and central
choice to define their individual
dignity and autonomy.”87
Three references. “The insult
or dignitary harm to same-sex
couples cannot be considered
in isolation. The Court must
also consider the dignitary
harm to religious objectors,
for whom ‘free exercise is
essential in preserving their
own dignity.’”89

Table 3: Relevant References to Dignity
in the Amicus Briefs Submitted
Dignity in the judgment: Dignity is mentioned six times in the
judgment. It is mentioned to set the framework for the need for
equal treatment of individuals: “Our society has come to the
recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as
social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.” However, no
real consequence is derived from this general framework.
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the
purpose of this study but with no direct reference to dignity.90
81. Brief for Christian Bus. Owners Supporting Religious Freedom as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (No.16-111).
82. Id. at 10.
83. Id. at 23.
84. Id. at 25.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 32.
88. Brief for Christian Legal Soc’y et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
89. Id. at 5
90. See, e.g., Brief for Found. for Moral L. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); Brief
of Amici Council for Christian Colls. & Univs. et al. Supporting Neither Party, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); Brief for Ethics and
Religious Liberty Comm. of the Southern Baptist Convention et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (No. 16-111); Brief for Christian L. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
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2. Lautsi v. Italy91
Holding: The decision to display crucifixes in the classrooms of
public schools attended by the applicant’s children was within the
margin of appreciation left to the respondent State in the context of
its obligation to respect, in the exercise of the functions it assumes
in relation to education and teaching, the right of parents to ensure
such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious
and philosophical convictions.92
Dignity in the judgment: In the context of the judgment,
arguments based on dignity did not play a role and did not
influence the final outcome.
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs, relevant for the
purpose of this study but with no direct reference to dignity.93
D.

Collective Religious Freedom

1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
Holding: As applied to closely held corporations, the
regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human
Services requiring employers to provide their female employees
with no-cost access to contraception violate the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.94
Dignity in the judgment: In the context of the majority opinion,
arguments based on dignity did not play a role and did not
influence the final outcome. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy underlined how
[i]n our constitutional tradition, freedom means that all persons
have the right to believe or strive to believe in a divine creator and
a divine law. For those who choose this course, free exercise is
essential in preserving their own dignity and in striving for a selfdefinition shaped by their religious precepts. Free exercise in this
sense implicates more than just freedom of belief. 95

91. Lautsi
v.
Italy,
30814/06
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104040.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Brief for All. Def. Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Applicants, Lautsi v.
Italy, 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) (not admitted by the court).
94. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
95. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring)
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This understanding of free exercise and its direct link with dignity
seems to reflect the position of some of the organizations that
submitted amicus briefs before the Court.
Organizations
Family Research Council96
American Center for Law and
Justice97

Reference to Dignity
One reference. Not central
for the development of
the argument
Four references. “Amici urge
this Court, in its adjudication
of the issues involved in these
cases, to be mindful of the
dignity of individual
conscience and the right of
religious exercise our
forefathers held sacred in the
founding of this country”98;
“Whether this country will
continue to preserve the
dignity of conscience and
robustly protect religious
freedom in the future largely
depends on how this Court
rules in the cases at bar”99;
“While the government may
not question the sincerity of
the religious beliefs of
business owners like Amici, it
directly questions—in fact,
seeks to eradicate—their
ability to run their businesses
according to these beliefs,
specifically, on an issue of
what they believe to be of

96. Brief for Fam. Rsch. Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hobby Lobby
and Conestoga, et al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014)
(Nos. 13-354, 13-356).
97. Brief for Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Hobby Lobby et
al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356).
98. Id. at 61.
99. Id. at 12.
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supreme importance: the
dignity and sanctity of
human life, in its creation
and transmission.”100
Table 4: Relevant References to Dignity
in the Amicus Briefs Submitted
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the
purpose of this study but with no reference to dignity.101
2. Fernández Martínez v. Spain
Holding: A Catholic bishop could decide not to renew the
contract of a teacher of Catholic religion who had joined a public
campaign to oppose the Catholic Church’s practice of celibacy
for priests.102
Dignity in the judgment: No reference to dignity can be found
in the text of the Grand Chamber judgment.
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the
purpose of this study but with no reference to dignity.103
E.

Abortion

1. Russo v. June Medical Services LLC
Holding: Louisiana’s Unsafe Abortion Protection Act, requiring
doctors who perform abortion to have admitting privileges at a
nearby hospital, is unconstitutional.104
Dignity in the judgment: No reference to dignity can be found
in the text of the final majority opinion of the Court.

100. Id. at 20.
101. See, e.g., Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Evangelicals as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hobby
Lobby et al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356);
Brief for the Knights of Columbus as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Private Parties, Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356).
102. Case of Fernández Martínez v. Spain, 56030/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145068.
103. See, e.g., Written Comments of Chair in L. & Religions of the Université catholique
de Louvain et al. as Third-Party Interveners, Fernández Martínez, 56030/07; Observations
écrites en tierce intervention du Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just., Fernández Martínez, 56030/07.
104. Russo v. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
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Different organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the
purpose of this study but with no reference to religion.105
2. A, B & C v. Ireland
Holding: Ireland failed to implement the right to a
legal abortion.106
Dignity in the judgment: The court did not make use of
arguments based on dignity to reach its final judgment. The only
reference to dignity can be found at paragraph 162 of the judgment
where the requests of the applicants are summarized: “[T]he
criminalization of abortion was discriminatory (crude stereotyping
and prejudice against women), caused an affront to women’s
dignity and stigmatized women, increasing feelings of anxiety. The
applicants argued that the two options open to women—
overcoming taboos to seek an abortion abroad and aftercare at
home or maintaining the pregnancy in their situations—were
degrading and a deliberate affront to their dignity.”107
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the
purpose of this study but with no reference to dignity.108
CONCLUSION
Christian conservative NGOs and public-interest law groups
have faced important defeats before the U.S. Supreme Court and
the European Court of Human Rights. They have also seen
important victories, as is clear from the outcome of the Lautsi case
decided by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights. The Obergefell decision from the U.S. Supreme Court, on the
other side, has probably signaled the lowest point of influence for
religious-based litigation, even though, as we have seen, the
decision is today criticized also by progressive scholars and
activists. From the analysis undertaken in this article, and from the
105. See, e.g., Brief for Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent & Cross-Petitioner, Russo v. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Nos. 181323, 18-1460); Brief for Ams. United for Life as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent &
Cross-Petitioner, Russo v. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460).
106. A, B & C v. Ireland, 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-102332.
107. Id. at 45.
108. See, e.g., Written Observations of Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Third-Party Intervener,
A, B & C v. Ireland, 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Written Observations of All. Def. Fund et
al. as Third-Party Interveners, A, B & C v. Ireland, 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).

1179

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:5 (2021)

decisions which have been analyzed, dignity-based arguments
have not played a key role in the context of the litigation
strategies or interventions before the European Court of
Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court. It has yet to be seen if
this trend will be confirmed in the future and if human dignity
will assume a more important role in strategies to advance legal
arguments via adjudication.
With the development of populist approaches to
constitutionalism, conservative Christian actors have also signaled
an approach that is critical of international organizations and
international law. For instance, the European Centre for Law and
Justice has recently been at the center of a debate on the workings
of the European Court of Human Rights through the publication of
a report aimed at showing the supposed bias of the court.109 If a
populist approach will hegemonize the approach of conservative
Christians and drive them outside the boundaries of institutional
trust, it will be difficult for them to provide a significant
contribution to the development of the role of human dignity in
adjudication. What will happen to the Christian legal movement,
and especially to its American core, will be of fundamental
importance also for future developments in Europe and in the
world. It seems, as argued by Daniel Bennett, that
[r]egardless of the Obergefell decision, the Christian legal
movement is too well funded and organized to simply disappear.
Armed with million-dollar budgets and attorneys committed to a
broader cause, Christian conservative legal organizations are not
built to fade away. Some of its groups may dissolve over time, but
the broader Christian legal movement is poised for a sustained
presence on the stage of legal and cultural conflict. 110

But to the development of which notion of dignity will these
actors contribute? Will they focus their efforts on a truly global
effort for the promotion of an inclusive notion of human dignity as
the basis for the protection of human rights? Or will they prefer the
less inclusive notion aimed at being exploited in the short-term
scenario of the political cycle? Important guidance to these actors
may come from the recent encyclical letter that Pope Francis
released in October 2020. In Fratelli tutti, Pope Francis mentions
109. EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST., NGOS AND THE JUDGES OF THE ECHR, 2009–2019 (2020),
https://eclj.org/ngos-and-the-judges-of-the-echr.
110. Bennett, supra note 7.
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dignity sixty-six times, but two paragraphs of the document are
particularly relevant for our analysis.111 In paragraph 8 of the
encyclical, Pope Francis makes an explicit link between the
recognition of dignity and the universal aspiration to fraternity:
It is my desire that, in this our time, by acknowledging the dignity
of each human person, we can contribute to the rebirth of a
universal aspiration to fraternity. Fraternity between all men and
women. . . . Let us dream, then, as a single human family, as
fellow travelers sharing the same flesh, as children of the same
earth which is our common home, each of us bringing the richness
of his or her beliefs and convictions, each of us with his or her own
voice, brothers and sisters all.112

In paragraph 22 of the encyclical, a direct connection between
the protection of human rights and dignity is made:
It frequently becomes clear that, in practice, human rights are not
equal for all. Respect for those rights “is the preliminary condition
for a country’s social and economic development. When the
dignity of the human person is respected, and his or her rights
recognized and guaranteed, creativity and interdependence
thrive, and the creativity of the human personality is released
through actions that further the common good[.]” Yet, “by closely
observing our contemporary societies, we see numerous
contradictions that lead us to wonder whether the equal
dignity of all human beings, solemnly proclaimed seventy
years ago, is truly recognized, respected, protected and promoted
in every situation.”113

There seems to be the opportunity in litigation to advance an
inclusive conception of dignity which is not necessarily
weaponized to continue to pursue culture wars by legal means.114
The cases analyzed have shown that the degree of attention to the
topic so far has not been particularly relevant. Therefore, there is
probably space to continue the conversation and the contribution
to the development of a jurisprudence built on dignity. Linking

111. POPE
FRANCIS,
ENCYCLICAL
LETTER:
FRATELLI
TUTTI
(2020),
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_
20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See CLIFFORD BOB, RIGHTS AS WEAPONS: INSTRUMENTS OF CONFLICT, TOOLS OF
POWER (2019).
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dignity to human rights and fraternity, as Pope Francis suggests in
Fratelli tutti, seems to offer a road full of potential.115

115. For full development of this position, see generally Andrea Pin & Luca P. Vanoni,
Catholicism, Liberalism, and Populism, 46 BYU L. REV. 1299 (2021).
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